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This paper looks at how Goal 6 of the UN Millennium Development Goals impacts 
on the well-being of the people affected by HIV/AIDS. The paper looks at a specific 
aspect of this: how the aid emphasised by Goal 6 is channelled towards community 
groups responding to the HIV/AIDS crisis. It does so by exploring the institutional 
mechanisms used by one of the key international organisations involved in the 
realisation of the MDGs – the World Bank – and its Multi-Country HIV/AIDS 
Program (MAP) in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The paper explores the role of local 
government, rivalry between different forms of civil society organisations, the 
problems associated with effective delivery and community feedback, donor responses 
to these problems, and how these factors impact upon the immediate and long-term 
realisation of Goal 6, and the position of communities within it. Key to which are 
themes of government ownership, conditionality, and divisions between 
implementation and decision-making. The paper is based upon extensive qualitative 
research into the MAP in East Africa.  
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The effective realisation of the eight UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) rests on 
the ability to transfer rhetoric into practice and delivery. At the crux of this delivery is the 
need to involve multiple actors at every level of governance, state and society to reach 
people living in extreme conditions of poverty. This paper looks at how the MDGs affect 
the human and social well-being of vulnerable groups by examining how the aid emphasised 
by Goal 6 – to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases - is channelled towards 
community groups responding to the HIV/AIDS crisis. Loose-knit community groups have 
played a vital role in the prevention, treatment and care of HIV/AIDS since the epidemic 
was first identified in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1980s. The rural demographic of sub-
Saharan Africa combined with the limited government resources in some countries has led 
to a front line of community health practitioners – predominantly female – who provide 
support systems and care for the sick, the dead, and their families. Through the prominence 
of Goal 6 and the work of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) 
the role of communities has risen to prominence, with aid agencies prioritising ways that 
address their concerns and support their ability to ‘cope’ (UNAIDS, 2008; Global Fund, 
2008). This paper considers the role of community groups by exploring the institutional 
mechanisms of community engagement used by one of the key international organisations 
involved in the realisation of the MDGs – the World Bank – and the Multi-Country 
HIV/AIDS Program (MAP). 
 
Launched in 2000, the MAP was a US$1billion commitment to scaling up prevention, 
treatment and care and helping countries in sub-Saharan Africa cope with HIV/AIDS. MAP 
funding was available to any country in sub-Saharan Africa that had a national strategic plan 
to fight HIV/AIDS, a national co-ordinating body, emphasised a multi-sectoral approach to 
HIV/AIDS, and committed to directing 40-60% of the MAP funds it received to civil 
society organisations (CSOs) (World Bank, 2007). CSOs in this instance predominantly 
meant small community groups or national non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This 
project was significant in that it was the first multilateral project of its kind to earmark such 
funds to community groups and that government ownership and accountability of the 
project was central to the conditional lending (World Bank, 2008). This paper examines the 
Bank’s implementation of the MAP in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda 2004-2006. The 
findings of the paper are drawn from research into the World Bank’s HIV/AIDS policies in 
East Africa. The paper’s conclusions are based on the findings of 163 semi-structured 
interviews with community groups, national and international non-governmental 
organisations, government agencies, and international organisations; 50 issued 
questionnaires; and participant observation of community meetings and partnership forums, 
conducted over the course of six months fieldwork in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, the UK, 
and the US. 
 
This paper pursues its aim in the following manner. First, it situates the MAP and the role of 
the World Bank within the context of Goal 6. Second, it outlines the main mechanisms of 
community engagement utilised by the Bank. As such, it discusses the role of local 
government facilitators within such a relationship, the District AIDS Councils (the DACs) 
and their inter-relationships with the central government National AIDS Councils (the 
NACs). Methods of interaction are analysed in line with the Bank’s established structures of 
funding, dialogue, partnering and networks. Third, the paper discusses the problems 
inherent within processes of engagement, the application of ownership at local government 
level, and the prevailing views of the community groups and NGOs that participated in 
research. Fourth, the discussion qualifies such opinions within the interests of these groups, 
the contentions within their arguments, and the Bank-proposed solutions to problems with 
the MAP. The paper then draws together its main findings as to what the implementation of 
the MAP reveals about the effectiveness and issues involved with delivery of Goal 6, its 
ability to reach people affected by poverty, and the impact it has on well-being.  
 
HIV/AIDS, the World Bank and Goal 6 
Understandings of the World Bank’s role in public health have shifted from the mapping of 
the relationship between the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Loewenson, 1995) to critically engage with how Bank policy and practice is influencing the 
global health agenda. The introduction of user fees and mechanisms of privatisation during 
the 1980s gave rise to the emergence of the Bank’s ‘top-down’ style of health policy reform 
that favours a pluralistic style of implementation and delivery of healthcare services (Lee and 
Goodman, 2002; Owoh, 1996). According to Buse, the World Bank’s role in healthcare has 
grown exponentially since 1969 as the World Health Organisation has become institutionally 
marred by negative publicity and a lack of organisational direction (Buse, 1994). What has 
occurred within this process has been the reduction of state financing and state provision for 
key aspects of the population and a rise in privatised service delivery as a perceivably more 
effective way of addressing health concerns (Gilson et al, 1994; Lorgen, 1998; Owoh, 1996). 
The use of multiple actors within healthcare provision has been acutely felt at the 
community grassroot where public policy initiatives seek to strengthen familial and 
community structures that care for the sick. The tendency towards community provision is 
not specific to public health, but has been a constant within development policy and 
planning over the last ten years. Specifically within the Bank’s Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and model of community-
driven development. 
 
The practice of community delivery and how it is organised however rests on the state 
structures. It also necessitates a certain level of institutional infrastructure for delivery, 
feedback and monitoring. As this paper will show, in practice community engagement within 
healthcare provision, is bounded within service delivery and a lack of reciprocity in terms of 
decision-making and the input of local ideas. The need for state structures of funding and 
feedback, the Washington-based dynamic to decision-making and agenda setting, and the 
lack of community consultation all limit the responsiveness of people living with and 
affected by HIV/AIDS.  
 
This becomes particularly significant to Goal 6. The UN’s commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria and other diseases has thus far been addressed through financial means. A significant 
part of the US$10billion that is channelled to the fight against HIV/AIDS is directed to 
community groups. The logic being that the epidemic targets and spreads through 
communities, provision is based at the community, so prevention, treatment and care 
interventions should target local activity. However, as the MAP indicates, processes of 
getting the money to the community, what happens when it is there, and the structures and 
directives initiated by the Bank to do so make this initiative problematic. 
 
Methods of Community Engagement: ‘1000 Flowers Bloom’ 
The methods of community engagement used by the Bank through the MAP fit within a 
particular interpretation of community-driven development, rooted in the idea that 
communities are best placed to generate projects and ideas for policy as they can identify the 
main issues and means to address them. The inclusion of community groups within its 
HIV/AIDS policies reflects a wider trend in community inclusion in issues of public health 
that has long been recognised within health policy literature.i The MAP has no clear 
objectives or criteria which community groups must fulfil, other than an overall strategy to 
direct funds to a vast array of groups so as to cover all aspects of the response and 
encourage an upsurge in community participation. Key to this was the community’s ability to 
hold their governments to account for how they addressed HIV/AIDS. Each of the three 
countries explored within this paper have a specific community project: the HIV/AIDS 
Community Initiative in Kenya; the Community Action Fund (CAF) in Tanzania; and the 
Community HIV/AIDS Initiative (CHAI) in Uganda (World Bank, 2000a; World Bank, 
2000b; World Bank, 2000c; World Bank, 2000d; World Bank, 2000e; World Bank, 2003a; 
World Bank, 2003b; World Bank, 2003c; World Bank, 2003d). Each of these projects uses 
funding, dialogue, and networking as the main method of community-driven development. 
Key to these methods is the District AIDS Councils (DACs).  
   
The District AIDS Councils (DACs) 
Access, funding, and feedback from community groups to the Bank occur within a 
decentralised governance structure through the DACs. These agencies function as the 
intermediaries between the community and the centralised government NACs, and in some 
cases the Bank. As District representatives of the NACs, the DACs work in close association 
with their national counterparts. The DACs plan the District’s response to HIV/AIDS in 
line with the national strategic plan, draw up and manage the District HIV/AIDS budget, 
facilitate community sensitisation and awareness-raising of the MAP, design and issue the 
call for proposals, disburse funds to the community, conduct monitoring and evaluation of 
funds, and feed information back to the NACs and the Bank. The DACs are responsible for 
the co-ordination of all CSOs active in one area; they should be aware of their coverage, 
activities and outcomes. The average DAC in Uganda is supposed to co-ordinate the 500 
CSOs under the CHAI (Harman, 2005a). The number of DACs per country varies with size 
and the government, but the scope of CSOs they cover is approximately the same (National 
AIDS Control Council, 2005a). 
 
Funding 
Funding of community groups forms the basis of the MAP’s engagement methods. Funding 
of approximately UK£2,500 is disbursed quarterly to community groups or CBOs by the 
Bank, through the DACs (National AIDS Control Council, 2005a; Harman, 2005b). 
Communities funded under the MAP do not have to follow particular activities or fulfil 
standard objectives. Initial community access, mobilisation, and calls for proposals are 
conducted through posters, meetings, notices in local markets, and targeting key people 
within communities as ‘community mobilisers’ (Harman, 2005c; Harman 2006a). Proposals 
from community groups are submitted and if viewed viable and workable, approved. 
Activities at the community level include the thematic areas of care and treatment, 
prevention and mitigation of new infections, improvement on quality of life for people 
infected with HIV/AIDS, support and co-ordination, mitigation of socio-economic impact, 
and civil society and private sector engagement. The scope of the activities depends on the 
size and capacity of the group.  
 
The majority of community groups interviewed had begun as issue-specific organisations, 
but responded to growing needs in the community by expanding and adapting their 
practices. Those organisations that had expanded their practices were able to attract wider 
funds, as donors perceived them to have a more holistic approach in responding to the 
epidemic, and it is more cost effective to fund one group that engages in multiple activities 
than various different organisations. Expansion of practices, however, requires greater 
funding in the first place. Thus organisations seek a range of funding in order to attract 
additional funding. The cyclical nature of this excludes smaller community groups that do 
not have the means to provide a small amount of seed money to expand their operations, or 
may have limited access to other, slightly larger organisations that may assist with this. This 
co-dependency between expansion and funding is felt acutely by many of the community 
groups interviewed, and is seen as one of the main limitations to their expansion and ability 
to delivery services to the community (Harman 2005c; Harman 2005d; Harman 2005e; 
Harman 2005f). 
 
Interviews with community groups suggest that the majority of funding disbursed to the 
community is for training programmes. Training occurs from the top down. Community 
groups are trained in home based care, counselling, peer education, and basic methods of 
prevention of mother to child transmission by INGOs and NGOs. The community groups 
then utilise these skills to train and ‘sensitise’ other members of the community.ii The result 
is that most community activity focuses on training, whilst issues of delivery in health 
services, education, and psycho-social support remain unfulfilled.  
 
Feedback and Dialogue 
Dialogue is the second form engagement takes at the community level. The Bank engages in 
dialogue through the decentralised NAC/DAC system and community visits. There are 
three central forms of community feedback and dialogue. The first is through the 
submission of quarterly reports from MAP sponsored community groups to the DACs. 
Second, quarterly meetings are held within the District in which recipients of MAP funds 
discuss their activities, the problems in implementation, and put questions to the DACs. 
Third, through joint planning meetings and operations. The groups partnered by the DACs 
are notably national or international NGO representatives such as TASO in Uganda and 
World Vision (Harman, 2005g), and the heads of particular community-based networks that 
prove their utility through longevity and direct links to the community. Bank representatives 
– nominally Task Team Leaders of the project (TTLs) - visit communities quarterly. 
Unstructured forms of dialogue occur through Bank TTL quarterly visits to different 
community groups, and ad hoc partnerships such as a representative issuing awards at a 
football tournament designed to educate young people about HIV/AIDS (Harman, 2005c). 
Of the community groups interviewed none had engaged in unstructured dialogue (dialogue 
that was not report-writing) with the Bank.    
 
Networks 
The final form engagement takes at the community level is networking. The utility of 
networks as a means of influencing decision-making has been recognised by some 
community groups (Harman, 2006a; Harman, 2006b). Groups at the community level stress 
their wider interactions through joint referrals, combining services, and mutual stakeholder 
meetings as a way of demonstrating their efficacy and thus securing greater funding from 
donors (Harman, 2005e; Harman, 2005h; Harman, 2006c; Harman, 2006d). Networks of 
people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHAs) are on the increase, and are often linked with 
their national counterparts. However, the issues of distrust and issues of who or which 
organisation represents who are less clear at the community level where the greater concern 
is in regard to greater care and treatment of the sick (Harman, 2005i). Networks at this level 
are thus less to do with influence upon decision-making and more involved with efficiency in 
delivery of services.  
 
Problems and Contradictions of World Bank-Community Engagement   
Effective CSO engagement that facilitates community empowerment and widespread 
provision of services is a theme evident in discussions with World Bank or government 
representatives, but is less so in discussion with community groups. The majority of 
community groups interviewed remarked on the problems with funding, the lack of 
feedback to and interest by donors, and the problems with the DACs and NACs. Each of 
these factors was seen as significant limitations to their ability to influence decision-making 
and formulate their overall mandate within Goal 6. This section addresses each of these 
problems in turn. 
 
Funding and the DACs 
Community opinion suggests the central obstacle to effective engagement has been the 
short-term nature of funding. Funding is too little, too late (Harman, 2005g; Harman, 
2005h). Community groups sponsored under the MAP often end up with operational 
projects but no funds to continue to support them beyond their first year of operations. The 
mass sensitisation work conducted under the MAP has led to community awareness that the 
money is there, but the general perception is that the money has not reached the community 
(Harman, 2005j; Harman, 2006b; Harman 2006f). This issue presented the main concern of 
the community groups interviewed: where money from donors and the government goes. 
 
Community groups offer two explanations as to why the money is not reaching them. The 
first is the presence of ‘briefcase NGOs’ that present high standard proposals, receive the 
money and then disappear (Harman, 2005k; Harman, 2005l; Harman, 2005m; Harman, 
2006f; Harman, 2006h; Harman 2006i). The second explanation is failure of the DACs to be 
transparent and accountable to those organisations they engage with. Communities funded 
under the MAP are sometimes unclear about the disbursement process at the District level. 
They do not feel represented by the DACs and do not see a clear feedback structure from 
their report-writing, questionnaires or community visits (Harman, 2006j). Community 
groups see funding access and dialogue as dependent on knowing ‘the tricks of getting the 
money’ and having ‘someone who will push for you’ (Harman, 2005n). CSOs have to 
establish relationships at every level of decentralised government to achieve any outcome 
from their engagement (Harman, 2006k).  
 
A contentious issue given the bureaucratic nature of the DACs that is felt by both select 
community groups and INGOs is the issue of allowances. Allowances exist to a degree in 
Kenya and Uganda, and are widespread in Tanzania. Allowances are payments 
supplementary to wages. There is no clear definition of what they are paid for, but at the 
level of the DACs, they are claimed when DAC representatives attend meetings away from 
their headquarters, and/or go on community visits. Within the context of HIV/AIDS, 
allowance costs for the attendance at meetings and community visits are required by DAC 
officials at the approximate amount of UK£20 per day (Harman, 2006l). The majority of 
donors treat it as a grey area open to interpretation at the local level (Harman, 2006m). This 
is a barrier to effective community empowerment as the money paid to the DACs under 
allowances often comes directly from funds earmarked for community delivery, which in 
turn restricts the budget for community visits and direct engagement (Harman, 2006l).  
 
Capacity and the DACs 
Allowances are representative of the wider issue of limited institutional and financial capacity 
of the DACs. The emphasis upon rapid disbursement under the MAP led to the DACs 
being established with little understanding of the issues, mechanisms of governance, 
community engagement or training to address these gaps in knowledge. Management and 
disbursal of funds leaves minimal time and ability to co-ordinate activities within the District, 
the DACs central role (Harman, 2006n). The burden of managing multiple community 
groups and different donors on the DACs results in the slow disbursal of funds and a lack of 
absorptive capacity within the communities themselves (Harman, 2006o).  
 
The relationship between problems in funding mechanisms and the DACs are underpinned 
by a contradiction between ownership and conditionality. DAC staff members in all the 
countries considered acknowledge the influence of the MAP and World Bank priorities, yet 
reiterate ownership of the project. However, the DACs did not exist prior to the MAP. 
District HIV/AIDS work plans are designed in partnership with the NACs under the 
guidelines of each specific national strategic plan (Harman, 2005o) that represent the key 
principles of the MAP in each of the three countries studied. The DACs resisted CSO 
involvement, but had to agree to a CSO component of the District HIV/AIDS work plan in 
order to receive any funds. MAP funds earmarked to ‘familiarise’ DAC staff with the 
concept, was in effect training to teach them the ‘operationalisation of a multi-sectoral 
approach’ (Harman, 2005g). As such, every level of DAC-CSO engagement is ‘determined 
by the centre’ (Harman, 2005g), leaving minimal space for community and government input 
into the direction and implementation of the project. 
 The Bank 
Community viewpoints on the Bank itself are limited to non-existent (Harman, 2006b). 
Those aware of the Bank’s involvement in HIV/AIDS have a pragmatic view that their 
intentions were good but ‘their hands are tied due to the size of the project/policy and the 
‘through - through - through structures’’ (Harman, 2005n; Harman, 2006p). Community 
groups are more critical when discussing the MAP and its ‘owners’, the NACs, than the 
Bank. Many of the groups that took part in research do not feel the presence of the MAP at 
the community level and believe the majority of activity to be conducted by other donors 
(Harman, 2005n; Harman, 2005p; Harman, 2005q; Harman, 2005r; Harman, 2006q). Despite 
contributing to the capacity of smaller organisations, the community component of the MAP 
is viewed as unsustainable (Harman, 2005c; Harman, 2005i).  
 
The problems and perceptions underpinning CSO engagement have negative ramifications 
for communities affected by HIV/AIDS. Blockages in funding channels caused by 
bureaucracy, limitations in institutional capacity and questions of ownership reduce the 
amount of money, education and support for people living with HIV/AIDS. In separating 
decision-making and implementation whilst maintaining government ownership of the 
project, communities are unable to address these issues. There is, however, a need to qualify 
such criticisms with a critical assessment of how these problems relate to the community 
groups themselves, compared to the experience with other donors, and reflect wider issues 
within development delivery.  
 
Assessing the Problems and Perceptions of Community Groups 
The problems with engagement identified by the community groups that participated in 
research need to be offset by a deeper assessment of the issues these problems pose and the 
Bank’s response to them. Issues over funding, bureaucracy, and leverage are often based 
upon community group perception. This is evident in three ways. The first is in relation to 
the short-term nature and lack of evidence of funding. The US$10billion annually directed to 
HIV/AIDS relief, and the existence of multiple CSO activity suggests there is an abundance 
of funding. Often those groups that flagged the issue of funding had received money from 
the MAP and were submitting proposals to other donors. One of the main interests of 
community groups working in HIV/AIDS is to secure funds for their projects, and thus 
compete with other groups, and stress the need for more funding in line with their own 
interests. The issue of funding is pertinent for all community groups involved in research; 
however, problems associated with allocation and disbursement may be over-emphasised. 
 
Issues of what activities are funded are also in part the responsibility of community groups. 
None of the MAP community initiatives stipulated the need to fund specific activities; thus if 
all the activities funded are for training purposes it is because of what community groups 
specified in their project proposals. The MAP was the first multilateral commitment to 
HIV/AIDS of its kind; thus in engendering mass community responses, a degree of training 
people with the means of educating, caring and addressing issues facing communities 
affected by HIV/AIDS is inevitable. A greater problem with funding is the absorptive 
capacity of community groups themselves. MAP representatives in Kenya and Tanzania 
stipulated that should the funds be disbursed effectively, further funding would be made 
available by the Bank (Harman, 2005s; Harman, 2005t; Harman, 2006m). Issues with 
disbursement are part the problem of DAC infrastructure, but also part community group 
infrastructure. 
 
The second issue is that of bureaucracy and transparency. A degree of bureaucracy is 
inevitable within a project the size of the MAP and its use of state agencies and structures as 
the main channels for CSO engagement. Comparatively, the MAP has faired better in 
community opinion than other programmes of a similar scale such as the Global Fund 
(Harman, 2005n; Harman, 2006a; Harman, 2006j). A simple way of avoiding such 
bureaucracy would be to engage with fewer groups and focus on the national level alone, 
which would then undermine any form of community participation in the system. A further 
alternative would be to fund community groups directly with minimal state intervention. 
However, the Bank is mandated to work in partnership with states. To work independently 
of states would undermine any long-term commitment to building infrastructure and the 
means to address the epidemic independent of foreign aid. The level of intricate problems 
associated with the MAP shows the ability of community groups to hold government 
agencies to account, and push for increased transparency, indicating the emergence of an 
effective civil society and fulfilling one of the MAP’s central objectives.  
 World Bank Responses to Community Criticism 
The Bank is fully aware of community perceptions and issues over funding, feedback and the 
capacity of the DACs. The changes it has made to the implementation structures of the 
MAP suggest that it is responsive to community needs and flexible with regard to state 
interests. The Bank interprets community awareness and complaints about the lack of 
funding as a good sign that communities are beginning to take ownership of the response 
and thus will incentivise the government to take action (Harman, 2005s). TTL of the MAP 
in Uganda, Peter Okwero, emphasises that despite some of CSOs’ misgivings concerning the 
community component of the MAP, the project has succeeded in motivating the community 
where other community focused projects have failed (Harman, 2005u).  
 
The NACs and the Bank have responded to the problems of the DACs in two distinct ways. 
The first, in reference to the DACs in Kenya, was to dismantle the DACs and replace them 
with District Technical Committees, to all intents and purposes fulfilling the same role but 
with greater emphasis upon addressing the difficulties and technicalities of channelling 
money to the communities. These committees are then assisted by Provincial AIDS Control 
Councils that co-ordinate the response at the regional level and provide support to the new 
District Technical Committees and the National AIDS Control Council (NACC), Kenya. 
Training and consultation was conducted by UNAIDS and the NACC so that each agency 
was able to better understand their role. Dismantling of the original structures combined 
with the problem of corruption at the national level led to a severe delay in MAP funding 
disbursement in Kenya. The second approach was to maintain the DACs but introduce 
Regional Facilitating Agents (RFAs) in Tanzania, or AIDS Control Units in Kenya, that 
would operate as an extension of the NACs mandate thus increasing the working capacity of 
the MAP at the national and district level. The RFAs were most obvious and influential in 
Tanzania. The central role of RFAs was to build the capacity of the regional secretariat, the 
Local Government Authority (LGAs), the DACs and the community, and to oversee and 
co-ordinate the overall implementation of the MAP community component. RFAs built 
capacity by mapping the number of CSOs in the area, their activities, shortfalls and 
successes, demonstrating successful models for implementation and monitoring of projects 
to both the DACs and the community, assisting the DACs with project appraisal and 
subsequently disbursing funds to communities. 
 
The difficulties and complexities of community delivery are reflected in the role of the 
regional agents introduced within the MAP, whose ability to reach people affected by 
HIV/AIDS was limited by the following. First, an initial lack of institutional support from 
the DACs because of a discrepancy over their respective mandates which in turn led to 
further delay in reaching the community (Harman, 2006r; Harman, 2006s). Second, because 
the lack of funding and human resources with the DACs, the RFAs had to spend much of 
their time training DAC staff (Harman, 2006l). Third, delayed disbursement gave rise to the 
notion that the system of community delivery was not working, and frustrated community 
trust in the process. Compounding this distrust of the RFAs by both the DACs and the 
community was the fact that the idea for them did not stem from the community, but by the 
Bank 
 
The introduction of RFAs reveals the following about community engagement under the 
MAP. First, the Bank does acknowledge problems with funding of community groups and 
the DACs, and offers pragmatic responses to such issues. Second, the inclusion of INGOs 
and the private sector represents a third tier of governance structures separating the Bank 
from the community. Despite being designed to increase CSO engagement under the MAP, 
in the interim RFAs are seen by communities to reduce it by adding additional bureaucracy, 
further delays to funds, and a further removing the Bank from any form of direct 
engagement. Similarly to the issues with DAC funding, these problems can, however, be 
attributed to wider community distrust of INGOs and initial problems with the RFAs to the 
wider benefit of long-term engagement practice. Third, the introduction of RFAs challenged 
the Bank’s model of community-driven development. The Bank’s approach to community 
driven-development is based upon funding and tokenistic dialogue only, with little direct 
feedback to policy and decision making, whereas direct partnership and influence in 
decision-making remains the realm of the Bank’s natural partners, INGOs and the private 
sector.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored one of the main contentions within Goal 6 of the MDGs: the desire 
to channel resources and engage the opinions of those affected by HIV/AIDS as a means of 
combating the epidemic, and the problems associated with doing so. The paper has explored 
this issue by considering the central mechanisms of engagement used within the World 
Bank’s MAP project and the institutional problems associated with it. In so doing, the paper 
raises several concerns as to how the MDGs promote and achieve well-being for people 
affected by HIV/AIDS in East Africa. First, community participation in Goal 6 of the 
MDGs is characterised by service delivery only. Select community groups are receiving 
funds, but much of the money directed to them is lost in the process, and once the money 
arrives, it is often too little, too late. Second, communities do not drive the agenda of Goal 6 
with their ideas. The emphasis placed on funding as a means of engagement had bred 
increased competition and mistrust between various types of CSOs that compete for funds 
to maintain their relevance and influence within decision-making. This limits the formation 
of networks and collaborative mechanisms that increase communities’ capacity and leverage 
in making Goal 6 accountable and responsive to their needs.  
 
Third, the role of local government agencies as implementers of Goal 6 is central to 
understanding the problems and limitations of delivering resources to the community.  
Community engagement does not occur between the local and global levels but is dependent 
on government agencies and their ability to internalise and promote the rhetoric of the 
MDGs. These government agencies are limited by a loose-mandate that has to manage the 
competing objectives of multiple donors instead of designing locally responsive policies 
independent of international priorities. In sum, the international cycle of minimal direct 
community engagement and institutional bottlenecks that has continued to limit poverty 
efforts continues within Goal 6: with community groups managing their situation, but in no 
way coping with it.  
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